The second step that North Korea typically takes is to blame South Korea and the US for the tense situation. This is where we are today. North Korea is accusing South Korea of allowing non-government organizations (NGOs) to launch propaganda balloons into its airspace, a practice which Seoul had discouraged since the rapprochement between the North and the South in 2018. North Korea is clearly aware that the balloon campaigns are not promoted by the government in the South. In South Korea, the constitution guarantees such activity. Indeed, there are South Korean fan clubs that support North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and sister Kim Yo-jong, who acted as Pyongyang’s emissary in breaking the ice with the South when she crossed the border to attend the Winter Olympics opening ceremony in February 2018. While the administration of South Korean President Moon Jae-in is now using environmental laws and other technicalities to criminalize the propaganda balloon campaign, the North Korea reacted by blowing up the joint liaison office in Kaesong, north of the DMZ, which is used for intra-Korean talks, on June 16.
The third step that Pyongyang takes in its brinkmanship strategy is to give the impression that it is open for negotiations. But it will typically make an unreasonable demand or agree “in principle” to some improvement in relations. This time, North Korea called for the South to apologize for the NGO’s balloons and then openly demanded that Seoul break with the US and start economic exchanges between the Koreas in violation of UN sanctions.
The South is now anticipating step four. North Korea will likely set artificial deadlines to pressure the other side. To increase the tension, Pyongyang will go ahead with some of their initial threats such as re-occupying guard posts in the DMZ, redeploying soldiers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region, conduct military training along the DMZ and the Northern Limit Line (a disputed maritime demarcation line in the Yellow Sea), and carry out its own propaganda leaflet operations.
This is the most dangerous stage of the brinkmanship mainly because it relies on the restraint or even complacency of the South Korean military. Although North Korea understands the mechanics of South Korean society – its constitutionalism, rule of law, social trends and cultural attitudes – it cannot understand what even South Korean politicians themselves often fail to comprehend fully: the public mood. The dictatorship misinterprets public opinion and typically construes the robust debate in the South as a sign of weakness and social division rather than as an indication of the strength of South Korean democracy.
The South Korean military is composed of independent-thinking individuals capable of adapting to changing situations and equipped with modern weaponry. Since the early 2000s, South Korea has been able to react decisively to all North Korean military provocation, except for the sinking in 2010 of one of its corvettes by a torpedo fired by a small submersible. The heightened tension will increase the likelihood of North Korea provocation escalating into something much larger and uncontrollable.
Step five, then, is to take some provocative action. In the current situation, North Korea is likely to shower its own propaganda and trash over the South using drones. This could take its brinkmanship to the edge. The South Korean military is jumpy about North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles and such a move could trigger a shooting incident. All South Korean commanders will have to be especially alert and cautious.
After this, the next – and sixth – step that the North is likely to take is to politicize the situation, setting up negotiations but demanding preconditions and front-loading the agenda. The preconditions are typically Pyongyang’s real objectives. It is in this phase when North Korea blames South Korea and the US for delaying tactics and prolonging discussions. The seventh step is a demand for further compensation or a major concession before it will return to talks. There is an impasse. The eighth and final step is to return to step one.
This time the plot could be different, however. North Korea has nuclear weapons and has become overconfident. Its economy, however, is in a very difficult situation and it does not have the time to play its usual long game. And as has happened frequently in the past, the North Korean people are having to deal extreme hardships, particularly food shortages and malnutrition. These are grave internal challenges that can only be solved by external solutions – specifically, the relaxation of UN sanctions and humanitarian relief from overseas.