

# China-India-Japan in the Indo-Pacific

*Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure*



# China-India-Japan in the Indo-Pacific

*Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure*

*Editors*

Jagannath P. Panda

Titli Basu



PENTAGON PRESS

**China-India-Japan in the Indo-Pacific  
Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure**

*Editors: Jagannath P. Panda and Titli Basu*

First Published in 2018

Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

ISBN 978-93-86618-42-9

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission of the copyright owner.

**Disclaimer:** The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or the Government of India.

*Published by*

PENTAGON PRESS  
206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat  
New Delhi-110049  
Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568  
Telefax: 011-26490600  
email: rajan@pentagonpress.in  
website: www.pentagonpress.in

*In association with*

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses  
No. 1, Development Enclave,  
New Delhi-110010  
Phone: +91-11-26717983  
Website: www.idsa.in

Printed at Avantika Printers Private Limited.

# 15

## Soft Balancing: Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), India-Japan Arch in contrast to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China's Rising Influence

*Jagannath P. Panda*

---

Soft balancing is an integral aspect of balance of power strategy in international politics. State(s) rely on soft balancing to not only maximise their national interests but also enhance domestic capabilities in bringing out growth and development.<sup>1</sup> States engaging in this form of balancing primarily aim to protect their respective national security interests ahead of other competing powers while adapting to the rapidly changing international distribution of power system.<sup>2</sup> Balancing comes as a protective measure for less competent entities by forming an “alliance against the principal threat(s) or concern(s)”.<sup>3</sup> The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), co-envisioned by India and Japan in consultation with Africa, replicates a fine interface of soft balancing and balance of power that aims to not only enhance the Indian and Japanese domestic growth and development but also protect and enrich their national interests and presence in Africa and Asia, factoring the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a core interest and balancing China's rising influence in the region.

The AAGC is aimed more at enhancing India's and Japan's national interests while promoting a “liberal and value-based order” in the Indo-Pacific that would possibly challenge emerging unilateral and non-

democratic measures. As K.S. Bajpai has rightly argued: “India and Japan can honestly say that they are not building relations in hostility against China; but it is right for them to plan for the eventuality of Chinese hostility.”<sup>4</sup> The AAGC proposition draws from the two countries’ increasing geopolitical convergence of economic and strategic interests, wherein concerns over China’s growing strategic influence in the Indian Ocean, Africa and the Indo-Pacific in general remain a strong factor.

This chapter examines how the AAGC is the genesis of growing India-Japan strategic convergence to promote a “liberal value-based order” and a strategic response to the growing Chinese influence in Asia, Africa and the IOR. It contends that the AAGC proposition combines both overt and covert strategic interests to promote a liberal and value-based order in the Indo-Pacific by establishing strategic linkages between the continents of Asia and Africa while balancing the rapid growth of Chinese influence in these two continents.<sup>5</sup> The AAGC overlaps China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in terms of its core objectives, particularly in focusing on infrastructural investments, connectivity and growth corridors, among other things. In a comparative perspective, the BRI through its geographical coverage of Asia, Africa and Europe surpasses the AAGC in terms of its continental outreach. But the AAGC transcends the scope and scale of the BRI in terms of its universal approach of addressing human resource development in Asia and Africa. Unlike a single-country initiative that is based more on unilateral interests, the AAGC brings an intercontinental consultative mechanism to the core while aiming to promote infrastructural investments, connectivity and growth corridors, including human resource development that is based on universal values and norms. The AAGC is therefore more of a soft-balancing strategy of India and Japan to contest the rising Chinese influence, both within and outside the purview of the BRI, in Asia, Africa and the IOR.

### **AAGC’s Genesis: Between Concept and Conception**

Many in India and Japan contend that the AAGC is an old proposition in the making, much before China’s BRI was proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013.<sup>6</sup> A credible reference, including an official one, to this contention is however missing.<sup>7</sup> The AAGC proposition was formally discussed between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe at the India-Japan Annual Summit Meeting held in Tokyo in 2016.<sup>8</sup> The main thrust of this meeting was that both India and Japan must take advantage of their growing strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific region by establishing a chain of industrial corridors and industrial networks in and between Asia and


Africa. The joint statement, released on November 11, 2016, emphasised the need to “promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa” by focusing on joint projects in areas such as training and capacity building, infrastructure, connectivity and health.<sup>9</sup> Aiming to improve connectivity between the two continents, the two leaders stressed the need to promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” where a strategic synergy between India’s “Act East” and Japan’s “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” (EPQI; earlier known as PQI) was made clear.<sup>10</sup>

Formally, the idea of the AAGC was announced at the 52<sup>nd</sup> Annual Summit Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Gandhinagar, India, during May 22-26, 2017, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphatically stated that both India and Japan would aim to achieve closer developmental cooperation in Africa.<sup>11</sup> The announcement came against the backdrop of China’s much-highlighted BRI meeting that was held from May 14-15, 2017 in Beijing. The Chinese strategic circles commented that the AAGC was a “duplication of the freedom corridor” that was originally proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 in Tokyo while meeting with Prime Minister Modi.<sup>12</sup> Many comparisons are being drawn between the AAGC and BRI since the compass of both the initiatives overlaps to some degree, particularly in factoring connectivity and infrastructure as two main constituents in the Indo-Pacific/Asia-Pacific region.<sup>13</sup>

Since its official conception in 2016, premier think tanks in India, Japan and Indonesia have worked together to enrich the AAGC’s vision. A vision document was released in May 2017 at the AfDB Summit in Gandhinagar which was jointly prepared by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) in India, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in Jakarta, and the Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), in consultation with their respective governments.<sup>14</sup> Focusing on Africa and the Indian Ocean, the vision document stresses on building capacity in the Indo-Pacific region with four target areas: (a) development and cooperation; (b) “quality infrastructure” and digital and institutional connectivity; (c) enhancing capabilities and skills; and (d) establishing people-to-people partnerships. The AAGC promotes an intercontinental framework of cooperation based on a “people-centric” proposition with the goal to enhance “growth and interconnectedness between and within Asia and Africa”.<sup>15</sup> Based on a consultative mechanism, it aims to promote quality infrastructure and digital and regulatory connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region with the collaboration of Asia and Africa. In this strategic formulation, Africa remain the focal point.<sup>16</sup>

The target is to integrate Africa by establishing strategic linkages with other regions South Asia, including India, Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania (see Map 1). Though an official map of the AAGC is as yet unavailable, depicting the AAGC's geographical parameters points to the global ambitions that both India and Japan hold in the Indo-Pacific (see Map I). The *AAGC Vision Document* lists a number of objectives: *First*, an intercontinental framework where India and Japan can play leadership roles in attaining the infrastructural investment needs of both Asia and Africa. Asia's total infrastructural investment needs are themselves more than half of the world requirement, with China, India and Japan having the greatest infrastructural needs in Asia.<sup>17</sup> Likewise, Africa needs around US\$100 billion in new infrastructure every year to remain competitive in the developing world.<sup>18</sup> The AAGC aims to address these infrastructural needs through various multilateral banks, wherein India and Japan could possibly play a leading role. Though a concrete charter and work plan on how to generate funds to meet these infrastructural needs is missing at present in the *AAGC Vision Document*, still, it is expected that the AAGC maybe able to address these current infrastructural needs of both Asia and Africa by taking advantage of Japan's influencing position in the Asian

**Map 1: Asia-Africa Growth Corridor**





Development Bank (ADB) and in the AfDB where both India and Japan can cooperate.

*Second*, promoting quality infrastructure and establishing digital and institutional connectivity in and between Asia and Africa are AAGC's two main targets. These two issues are complementary in many respects. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) states that "quality infrastructure" brings together different "initiatives, institutions, organisations, activities and people" to promote or implement a particular policy or a combination of different national-quality policies within a regulatory framework.<sup>19</sup> Quality infrastructure is generally promoted through a public-private mode of participation involving a consultative process between local, national and regional or international actors. The AAGC aims to promote it by focusing on digital and institutional connectivity. Though these objectives look quite ambitious at present, they are the prime national policy focus of India and Japan currently and linked to their foreign policy outreach. Japan has long been aiming to promote quality infrastructure, in order to position its own influence in the world by highlighting the deficiencies in the Chinese non-qualitative infrastructural investment across the world, mainly in Africa.

*Third*, the AAGC aims to promote a liberal and value-based Indo-Pacific order, coinciding with the co-envisioned India-Japan *Vision 2025*.<sup>20</sup> Conceptualised between India and Japan in 2015 as part of their "Special Strategic and Global Partnership", *Vision 2025* has the thrust to develop a "deep, broad-based and action-oriented partnership" in the Indo-Pacific. The demand is more for principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, where the emphasis is on promoting an "open global trade regime" along with "freedom of navigation and overflight", among other things. It stresses the focus on "reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures" aimed at enhancing connectivity in the IOR, which not only complements India's Act East policy and Japan's EPQI initiative but also forms a strategic convergence between India's and Japan's security interests in the Indo-Pacific. Most importantly, the AAGC facilitates the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" that Japan aims to promote in the IOR in order to deal with the rising unilateral Chinese presence and influence in the region. The idea is to establish a strategic synergy between the "two oceans" – Indian and Pacific – and two continents – Asia and Africa<sup>21</sup> – where both India and Japan can cooperate to balance China's influence in the region.

These objectives indicate that the AAGC proposition is more aspirational. Indeed, a further reading of the *AAGC Vision Document* indicates that the India-Japan soft-balancing strategy is an effective and

advanced tool to balance China's rising influence. It exhibits elements of soft balancing while involving a tactical, informal and adhoc security understanding between India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. Besides, it complements the spirit of the US-India-Japan trilateralism that supports the idea of strengthening "regional connectivity" in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>22</sup> In other words, the AAGC concept is based on foreign policy strategic consonance between India and Japan by taking a panoramic view of the evolving Indo-Pacific security order to prepare to meet the challenges emanating from a futuristic China. The US' retreat from Asia under President Donald Trump would make the AAGC proposition even more relevant in the times to come for both India and Japan, and importantly, to think for an alternative futuristic security calculus even though both embrace the idea of a "quadrilateral" initiative along with the US and Australia. Besides, the AAGC exhibits the changing calculus of both Indian and Japanese strategic thinking on the Indo-Pacific, which is set to emerge stronger than earlier, showing that both India and Japan are no longer reluctant to show leadership visions in Asia. The intent to establish a liberal order, in an envisioned "free and open" Indo-Pacific, explains the strategic nuances that India and Japan attach to the AAGC.

### **AAGC: Competing with China's BRI?**

Fundamentally, the AAGC and BRI have some overlap in their objectives. The BRI's major goals, as per China's vision and action plan document released in March 2015, are to promote policy coordination, facilitate connectivity, enhance trade and investment cooperation, achieve financial integration and enhance people-to-people contacts.<sup>23</sup> Its main focus has been more on connectivity and infrastructural investment, which have been the two main aspects of China's external engagement strategy. That draws a parallel to the AAGC, which equally emphasises on connectivity and promotion of infrastructural investment, among other issues, including the promotion of people-to-people contacts. Nevertheless, the AAGC is not really a direct response to the BRI since the policy character and connotations of both these initiatives differ, which make the AAGC more a soft initiative to balance China's presence and influence in Africa and Asia than completely negating the BRI itself.

In particular, the AAGC embraces universal values concerning human resource development while prioritising infrastructure investments, connectivity and growth corridors. On the other hand, the BRI prioritises China's national interests in promoting infrastructure investments and connectivity across different continents. The funding for BRI projects comes

essentially from Chinese banks, or from Chinese Government sources like the Silk Road Fund (SRF) or through collaborative international measures where Beijing holds a dominant say in project financing. The scope of the BRI is promoted within Beijing's national perspective to position China as the centre of regional and global development. In fact, the BRI compliments greatly China's international vision of emerging as a "leader of globalisation". In his speech at the 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed the promotion of economic globalisation to increase "China's economic power and composite strength".<sup>24</sup> The AAGC, on the other hand, intends to generate private, government and also international funding, possibly from the AfDB and ADB.

By stressing on the Sustainable Developmental Goals (SDGs), the AAGC aims to priorities areas such as health, agriculture, agro-processing, skill development, pharmaceuticals and tackling disaster management issues, apart from infrastructure development and connectivity. Though the BRI equally stresses on some of these issues, still, a more 'people-friendly' approach is envisioned in the AAGC proposed framework, which is based on a universal consultative approach that China's BRI does not employ. Essentially, the AAGC embraces more the international democratic norms and values that the BRI essentially overlooks. Differences notwithstanding, both the initiatives exhibit a certain degree of overlap and competing intentions. The BRI's success depends upon Chinese diplomacy, whereas the AAGC's success depends on the extent to which India and Japan push forward this idea with Africa. The success of the AAGC will depend upon the consultative execution of policies that India, Japan and Africa undertake collectively. If anything, the AAGC's primary vision is not to compete with any other propositions per se, but to engage in more meaningful developmental partnerships, both within and outside of Africa, within an intercontinental framework with Asia.

## **A Shared Perspective on BRI**

New Delhi's and Tokyo's stances on the BRI are both state-centric and governance-centric, linked to China's rise and influence in the world. Their problematic relationship with China comes as an additional factor. This shared perspective might encourage them further to promote the AAGC more prudently. India's primary reservation over the BRI is attached to the connectivity issues, which is aptly reflected in India's official position on the BRI.<sup>25</sup>

*Three things are clearly reflected in India's stance on the BRI. First, in*

principle, India does not concede the grandeur to China on being the leading regional connectivity promoter. New Delhi firmly argues that the BRI is a unilateral initiative of China that ignores “universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality”.<sup>26</sup> This is a strong stance even though India is linked with China in the sub-regional Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. India’s growing seriousness to pursue the India-Thailand-Myanmar Trilateral Highway and Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative, promote the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) and accede to the Convention on International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention)<sup>27</sup> explains that New Delhi has its own regional ambition of emerging as a leading connectivity promoter. New Delhi’s “Act East”, “Link West” and “neighbourhood first” policies also figure connectivity as a core agenda.

*Second*, New Delhi emphasises how India aims to enhance connectivity based on universal values and norms, contrary to China’s unilateral and authoritarian approach. India places equal importance on physical and digital connectivity, whereas China gives prime importance to promoting physical connectivity and economic corridors that will benefit primarily the Chinese economy.

*Third*, in opposing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), India brings the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity to the forefront, which the BRI undermines. In Beijing’s strategic foreign policy setting, the logic of sovereignty and history are employed selectively. This is clear in the context of China’s reservation on India’s oil exploration in the South China Sea vis-à-vis its unilateral engagement with Pakistan to implement the CPEC project in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).<sup>28</sup> The Chinese and Indian approaches, reactions and pursuit of national interests in these matters highlight their different state-centric approaches.

Japan’s stance on the BRI is not identical to that of India. Japan sent political representation to attend the May 2017 BRI Summit in Beijing. Abe has even publicly acknowledged the BRI as a grand initiative that offers scope for connecting the East and the West.<sup>29</sup> Taro Kono, Japan’s Foreign Minister, has even stated that the BRI “will be highly conducive to global economy” if pursued in an open and transparent manner.<sup>30</sup> Hiroshige Seko, Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, has expressed support to Beijing’s Silk Road projects and has signed a few cooperative projects which are seen as part of the BRI.<sup>31</sup> Still, Japan shares a state-centric and governance-centric opposition to the BRI, regionally and globally, that is similar to the Indian stance. Abe had earlier stated that “it is necessary for

infrastructure to be open to use by all, and to be developed through procurement that should be transparent and fair".<sup>32</sup> Calling for the BRI to adhere to a "common frame of thinking" in the region, Japan has maintained that projects must be "economically viable" and must take into account the interests of parties holding debts to return.<sup>33</sup> A similar concern is also noticeable on Japan's part where Tokyo decided not to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), noting that the AIIB falls short on "fair governance", "mainly relating to offering clarity on debt repayment and loan sanctions".<sup>34</sup> The principal Japanese position has been not only to highlight the flaws in the BRI but also equally to draw the attention of the global community towards how the Chinese state approach on infrastructure investment overlooks transparency and international norms.


The Japanese opposition to the BRI is more infrastructure investment oriented while India's prime opposition is based on connectivity that involves sovereignty and territorial integrity. Given India's neighbourhood proximity to China, New Delhi perceives the BRI as a strategy in expanding China's neighbourhood connectivity projects and sees it in terms of a security concern regionally, while Japan views the BRI more in the context of competition, for its own regional and global investment plan. The AAGC, that boards connectivity and infrastructure as two core objectives, combines these Indian and Japanese perspectives together, both regionally and globally. From a holistic perspective, the AAGC objectives – intercontinental cooperation, quality infrastructural promotion, connectivity and Indo-Pacific liberal order – are important strategic necessities for India and Japan in a rapidly evolving security order where China's rising influence and unilateral initiatives are common concerns for both.

## **Soft Balancing the Chinese Presence in Africa and Indian Ocean**

Africa as a strategic geographic location has attracted many countries which have prioritised the continent in their foreign policies. Accessing raw materials and energy resources and undertaking investments in the continent top many countries' policy agendas. Sectors such as manufacturing, services, infrastructure and telecommunications are equally attractive ends that offer massive opportunities. Aiming to have a longer-term impact in creating human development conditionality and forging ahead institutional capabilities are also among the foreign policy priorities for many countries, particularly India and China,<sup>35</sup> and including Japan today. At present, the West is less concerned about Africa politically. Earlier,

the Western presence in Africa was more focused on checking the communist expansion.<sup>36</sup> Since, in its view, the threat of communism has evaporated in Africa, the West currently prefers to engage with the continent by means of trade, aid, assistance and economic contacts.<sup>37</sup> Asian powers such as China, India and Japan equally see the African continent not only as an opportunity but also as an effective international continental partner for global partnership and for advancing their respective foreign policy objectives. Over the last one decade, the Chinese economic and infrastructural investment initiatives have emerged as an attractive model for many African countries ahead of the Indian and Japanese economic outreach programmes. China's trade and economic contact with Africa is still higher in order than other major countries, making it the most influential power in the making in this strategic continent (see Figure 1). The relationship between China and the rest of the developing world, including the Sino-African engagement, is becoming increasingly pragmatic, secularised and commercialised.<sup>38</sup> The African response to this Chinese developmental discourse initially was somewhat welcoming.<sup>39</sup> A subtle change has however been noticed in this African approach, with a number of Chinese projects and initiatives being questioned for their non-qualitative measures and low-cost offers. Many African countries are increasingly searching for alternative modes of cooperation without completely abandoning the option to cooperate with China. Both India

**Figure 1: Bilateral Trade with Africa, 2015**



*Source:* Data collected from various open sources: <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0013.html>; <http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/15/india-africa-bilateral-trade-hits-72-billion/>; <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/28/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-pledges-japan-will-invest-30-billion-in-africa-by-2018/#.WUbHSd6FUux>.

and Japan aim to capitalise on this critical change of mood in Africa. This serves Africa's interests, too, since the continent has been searching for alternative modes of interactions and networking for long.<sup>40</sup>

The year 1993 witnessed a new and meaningful attention in Japan's Africa outreach through the introduction of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). With the gradual decline of the official assistance from the developed countries to Africa, Tokyo saw an opportunity for itself in the early 1990s by offering more assistance through a more serious policy focus. The introduction of the TICAD (see Table 1), aiming to focus more on improving the socio-economic conditions, was a fine effort in this context.<sup>41</sup> Since then, Japan's economic interests in Africa have been growing continuously, with TICAD playing an instrumental role. The recent visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to Africa testify to this phenomenon (see Table 2). But though Tokyo's overall presence has increased in Africa and the relationship has become more institutionalised, Japan's engagement with Africa also faces a number of limitations. Through TICAD, Japan might have emerged as a key investor in Africa, but the Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to Africa has not increased significantly<sup>42</sup> (see Figures 2 and 3). Africa has hitherto not been a pivotal focus in Japanese policymaking. Nor has Japan tried to implement a "comprehensive" strategy towards Africa which would have allowed it to allocate more ODA. Rather, Japan's approach has been to concentrate on key countries in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, the Chinese presence has expanded in Africa through a "continental" strategy. The rapid emergence of China as a strong economic actor in Africa has discouraged Japan from offering higher amounts of ODA to the continent as it previously did in 2006-07.<sup>43</sup>

Shinzo Abe has shown a renewed commitment to Africa in the recent past (Table 2), and has tried to further institutionalise and strengthen Japan's outreach in Africa by attending the 6<sup>th</sup> TICAD in August, 2016, in Nairobi. This was the first time when TICAD was held outside Japan. With the theme "Quality and Empowerment", the 6<sup>th</sup> TICAD focused on quality infrastructure and development. Abe stressed on building "quality Africa" centred on infrastructure, human resources, and "Kaizen" (business efficiency).<sup>44</sup> Building on grass-roots governance outreach, Japan outlined an Africa policy, stressing on "resilient Africa", emphasising on health and social stability.<sup>45</sup> Tokyo's main intent is to promote investment-oriented high-quality infrastructure-specific outreach that will subdue the Chinese substandard and quantitative infrastructural development initiative in Africa. Japan has always alleged that Beijing's outreach in Africa is

Table1: Japan in Africa – Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)

Year/TICAD	Japan's Major Focus/Policy	Comments/Outcome
October 5-6, 1993: TICAD I	<p><b>Theme: Tokyo Declaration on African Development "Towards the 21<sup>st</sup> Century"</b></p> <p>Focus on sustainable, broad-based economic growth; improving quality of governance, transparency and accountability; sustainable development, stressing on regional economic cooperation and development; preparing a platform to share Asian developmental experiences with Africa; promoting international cooperation.</p>	<p>Inaugural conference where the focus was on political and economic reforms of Africa.</p> <p>Japan advocated for economic development of Africa through private sector engagement, regional cooperation and integration process, and sharing of Asian and African experiences with each other.</p>
October 19-21, 1998: TICAD II	<p><b>Theme: African Development Towards the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action</b></p> <p>Poverty Reduction and Integration into Global Economy: focus on coordination, regional cooperation &amp; integration; South-South cooperation; capacity building; gender mainstreaming; environmental management; social development and poverty reduction; promoting human development, education.</p>	<p>Japanese focus was on sub-Saharan countries of Africa.</p> <p>Japan aimed to extend approximately ¥ 90 billion of grant aid over the next five years, including educational facilities and improving living conditions.</p>
September 29–October 1, 2003; TICAD III	<p><b>Theme: African Development</b></p> <p>Overcoming poverty, low levels of agricultural and industrial and political insecurity and social strife; need for a more supportive international environment; promotion of "market access and fair trade to support the efforts of African countries to gain a meaningful foothold in the global market place".</p>	<p>10<sup>th</sup> anniversary declaration was released.</p> <p>Emphasis was more on developmental partnership, "ownership and partnership" and raising awareness about Africa.</p>
May 28-30, 2008; TICAD IV	<p><b>Theme: Towards a Vibrant Africa (Yokohama Declaration)</b></p> <p>Focus on infrastructure, trade, investment cooperation, including tourism and rural development; ensuring human security while focusing on education, health, governance; stress on climate change and environmental upgrade; enhancing Asia-African Intra-Africa cooperation, public-private partnership; development of African frontiers; dialogue with civil society, etc.</p>	<p>Boosting economic growth through Human resources development, industrial, agricultural &amp; rural development.</p> <p>Focus on millennium development goals (MDGs); pledged to double ODA without debt relief including bilateral grants by 2012. Concentrating in the areas of infrastructure, agriculture, trade and investment, education, health and water.</p>



Table1 Contd.

Year/TICAD	Japan's Major Focus/Policy	Comments/Outcome
June 1-3, 2013; TICAD V	<b>Theme: Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa</b> In February 2015, Japan revised the Official Development Charter; focus on Japan's assistance through joint efforts of both public and private sector through TICAD; stress on peace building and assistance to human security.	Aiming for inclusive and dynamic development of Africa. US\$ 32 billion in the next five years to boost economic growth including trade and investment, private sector development and natural resources. Also supported infrastructure, tourism, science and technology and human resource development.
27-28 August 2016; TICAD VI	<b>Theme: Advancing Africa's Sustainable Development Agenda: TICAD Partnership for Shared Prosperity</b> Promotion of structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialisation; quality of life and health, social stability; Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Implementation Plan.	Nairobi Declaration: focused on the challenges faced by Africa, such as decline of global commodity prices, Ebola outbreak and other issues including terrorism, radicalisation and climate change. US\$30 billion to support implementation of the three priority areas of the Nairobi Declaration and Implementation Plan, namely: (1) Promoting structural economic transformation through economic diversification and industrialisation. (2) Promoting resilient health systems for quality of life. (3) Promoting social stability for shared prosperity.


*Source:* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html>. Prepared by the author.

Table 2: Japanese Prime Ministers' Visits to Africa in Recent Years

<i>Date Visited</i>	<i>Countries Visited</i>	<i>Dignitaries Visiting</i>	<i>Important Joint Statements/MOUs</i>
April 28-30, 2006	Ethiopia	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi	The visit witnessed the announcement of the Yokohama Action Plan and the TICAD follow-up mechanism
August 27, 2013	Djibouti	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe	The Prime Minister announced support for continued economic cooperation and ODA up to \$14 billion, electricity infrastructure and maritime security
January 10-14, 2014	Mozambique, Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe	14 governmental and private agreements were signed, including the diplomatic notes amending the Annex of Japan-Ethiopia air services agreement as well as documents on economic or academic cooperation in Mozambique. Japan agreed to provide financial support of approximately \$320 million, aiming to respond to conflicts and disasters, peace and stability, including contributions to improve the situation in South Sudan, the Sahel region and Central African Republic.
January 18, 2015	Egypt	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe	Dialogue to strengthen bilateral, economic relations and tourism.
28 August, 2016	Kenya	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe	73 MOUs were signed between 20 African countries and Japan.


*Sources:* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; *The Japan Times*; *Asahi Shimbun*.

Figure 2: Net ODA, % of Gross National Income (GNI), 2000-2016



Source: OECD Data, at <https://data.oecd.org>.

Figure 3: Japan's Allocation of ODA to Africa (in million US\$)



Source: OECD Data, at <https://data.oecd.org>.

unethical, where China floods cheap goods and offers attractive ODA that is unaccountable to take advantage of the African resources.<sup>46</sup>

Japan's rising international ambition to gather Africa's support on multilateral forums, especially for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent berth, is an additional factor which the AAGC may facilitate. Japan's strong advocacy to reform the UN and UNSC factors African support as a crucial component. Germany, India, Japan and Brazil, clubbed as G-4 countries, have a credible case for demanding a permanent berth at the UNSC. To side-line the G-4 demand, China advocates for African representation in the UNSC, bringing the logic of continental representation to the UNSC reform debate. Keeping this background in perspective, Japan equally advocates African representation in the UNSC. Offering "complete support" to Africa and its "Agenda 2063",<sup>47</sup> Shinzo Abe in his TICAD VI speech stated that Japan supports the idea of Africa having a representation in the permanent membership at the UNSC by 2023.<sup>48</sup>

This Japanese perspective conveniently establishes a strategic congruence with India's Africa policy. Stressing the need to establish a "model of cooperation" between India and Africa that will be "demand-driven and free of conditions", Prime Minister Narendra Modi has labelled engagement with Africa as a "top priority" in Indian foreign and economic engagement policy.<sup>49</sup> While announcing the AAGC, Modi had announced both the US and Japan as India's partners for developmental work in Africa. The year 2000 witnessed India introducing a "Focus Africa" programme,<sup>50</sup> aiming to design a "developmental partnership". Gradually, over the last two decades, India-Africa relations have become more institutionalised through a range of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to be offering a newness to this engagement, showing a greater level of engagement in the field of energy security, greater market access, co-development of infrastructure and maritime security cooperation.<sup>51</sup> The third India-Africa Summit held in New Delhi in October 2015 renewed India's outreach in Africa and strengthened India-Africa relations.

Newness has certainly been noticed in India's current Africa outreach. *First*, in contrast to India's earlier "Focus Africa" programme, India's current approach towards Africa is based on a continental framework. For example, almost 40 African representatives attended the Third India-Africa Summit. India earlier used to invite only 15 countries under the Banjul formula, where the choice of countries was always decided by the African Union.<sup>52</sup>

*Second*, Africa is seen as a multilateral partner in a range of areas such as climate change, trade regimes and UN/UNSC reforms. For instance,

centred on a “common, but differentiated, negotiation framework” in multilateral forums, India advocates for a unified policy position with Africa on a range of issues including climate change.<sup>53</sup> India has invited Africa to join hands not only in dealing with the global climate change, but also in a collaborative effort to forge an “alliance of solar-rich countries”. Focusing on the Doha Development agenda, India foresees Africa as a partner in global trading regimes in the field of agriculture and food security.

*Third*, rejecting a “donor-recipient” archetype of engagement, India has advocated developmental challenges as an “international responsibility” and has tried to forge a more credible India-Africa partnership. Three principles – no conditionality, no policy prescriptions and no questioning of the sovereignty of the partnering country – have been the basis of the India-Africa partnership.<sup>54</sup>

*Fourth*, India sees the African littoral countries as strategically important to its Indian Ocean policy. Aiming to have stronger India-Africa maritime relations, India has been trying to solidify its maritime linkages with many African littoral and inland countries. Prime Minister Modi’s visits to Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya in 2016 and to Mauritius and Seychelles in 2015 strengthen this assertion. Offering greater military aid, training assistance and capacity-building exercises has been the main thrust of India’s maritime diplomacy especially with regard to the African littoral countries. Crafting stronger maritime and shipping contacts has been one of the focuses in India’s Africa policy. Prime Minister Modi stressed the same in his second Raisina Dialogue speech in New Delhi on January 17, 2017, where he stated that India wants to build its own developmental partnership that “... extends from the islands of the Indian Ocean and Pacific to the islands of the Caribbean and from the great continent of Africa to the Americas”.<sup>55</sup>

These efforts, complementing the AAGC, certainly explain India’s increasing seriousness towards Africa. In recent years, Beijing has invested heavily in diplomatic, economic and political ties with Africa, resulting in substantial China-Africa engagement. Beijing’s naval outreach has increased in the East African coast where China focuses on key maritime zones, capacity-building exercises, building infrastructure and promoting investment for the protection of maritime zones in the IOR. Specifically, the East African countries are factored importantly in China’s 21<sup>st</sup> century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The *Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative*, an official document released by China on June 20, 2017, stresses on ocean cooperation and highlights how China aims to build on the China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Sea blue economic passage.<sup>56</sup>

The Chinese intent is to establish new initiatives and maritime routes to promote maritime connectivity in the IOR, stressing on the Indian Ocean.

In fact, China's aim to emerge as a stronger maritime power is gaining momentum. In his speech at the 19<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping stated that "China will pursue a coordinated land and marine development, and step up efforts to build China into a strong maritime country".<sup>57</sup> Hu Jintao, too, in his 18<sup>th</sup> National Congress report had emphasised on the Chinese intent to enhance capacity for exploring marine resources, increase marine economy and safeguard China's marine interests and rights to eventually establish China as a maritime power.<sup>58</sup> A reflection of this Chinese interest has been clearly visible in the last few years when the Chinese focus has been on the IOR to invest in strategic ports, construct marine commercial points and naval bases. Given this rising Chinese presence, many countries' foreign policies have witnessed changes, if not in reaction, then in retrospection, including that of India and Japan. The arrival of the AAGC is a clear reflection of this India-Japanese retrospection.

### **Summing Up:**

#### **AAGC is a Product of India-Japan Globalism**

In response to China's growing ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Africa, Japan and India agreed in 2015 to increase industrial networks and regional value chains with an "open, fair and transparent" business environment in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries enhanced this idea further in 2016 by identifying strategic convergence and synergy between India's Act East policy and Japan's EPQI. Japan's EPQI is a foreign policy initiative that focuses on greater connectivity between Asia and the rest of the world, including Africa,<sup>59</sup> whereas India's Act East policy emphasises on connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region, including a special focus on the neighbouring Southeast Asia. The AAGC contextualises how both Japan and India prime each other as global partners in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific environment. India's Act East policy factors Japan as a "special" partner, while Japan's EPQI factors India as a key economic and strategic partner in its regional and global outreach. Partnership on infrastructure building and connectivity are accorded two important objectives in this strategic congruence.

Japan has been concerned about China's rising profile in Africa and maritime outreach in the Indian Ocean. Beijing's growing counter-piracy operations along the African coasts and participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and capacity-building exercises have been a serious cause of concern for Japan for some time. As a result, Japan

has begun to show greater interest in Africa, primarily through security undertakings where Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) have played a key role in various counter-piracy operations, e.g. the UNPKO in South Sudan, and in expanding its first overseas base, from just an airfield to a military base, in Djibouti. In other words, Tokyo is aiming to pursue a more security-oriented partnership with Africa. Eclipsing the Chinese presence in Africa, mainly China's maritime reach with the African littoral states, is a crucial factor that Japan finds difficult to handle singularly. Tokyo's limited maritime outreach on the African coast has restricted its ability to emerge as a security provider in Africa. India has emerged as a natural partner in this Japanese endeavour.<sup>60</sup> This equally benefits India's strategic positioning in the region. Therefore, the AAGC signifies a growing strategic convergence between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific.

On Tokyo's part, the attempt to establish a strategic connection between Asia and Africa, factoring India as a global partner, has a sequential route which was articulated by Shinzo Abe in his influential speech entitled "Confluence of the Two Seas" as far back as August 22, 2007, in the Indian Parliament. Abe had forcefully articulated that Japan and India along with countries like Australia and the US must establish strategic networking spanning the Pacific and Indian Oceans.<sup>61</sup> Thrusting on Japan's and India's ability to take greater "responsibility" in international affairs, he had stressed that the aim should be to nurture and enrich the Pacific and Indian Oceans as "Seas of clearest transparency".<sup>62</sup>

In the larger context of the AAGC, China's growing influence and the India-Japan growing global partnership, three points can be noted: *First*, the AAGC is at present an abstract idea that is based on an intercontinental framework, making it really an ambitious proposition. The AAGC arrives at a post-US "pivot to Asia" strategy, encouraging India and Japan to take a lead in regional affairs, factoring Asia and Africa. *Second*, the AAGC's strategic foundation is based on the power struggle over infrastructure, investment and connectivity, both in Asia and Africa. In this power struggle, an India-Japan strategic congruence is clearly emerging, to balance out the Chinese influence, including the flagship BRI. *Third*, the AAGC is a result of the Indo-Pacific security coalition led by India and Japan. Barring Africa as a continent, though the AAGC proposition is yet to directly involve a third country, the AAGC framework complements the changing security order in the Indo-Pacific region against unilateralism and authoritarianism. Importantly, the AAGC backs a rule-based order that is democratic and transparent.

## NOTES

1. Aristotle Tziampiris, "Chapter 2: Balance of Power and Soft Balancing", *The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation*, Springer, Switzerland, 2015, pp. 21-30.
2. K. S. Bajpai, "Japan, India and the Balance of Power", *The Hindu*, January 27, 2014, at <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/japan-india-and-the-balance-of-power/article5620518.ece> (Accessed January 14, 2018).
3. Stephen Waltz, *The Origin of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Cornell, 1987, p. 17.
4. K. S. Bajpai, No. 2.
5. This chapter is a revised and updated version of the author's earlier paper published in *Focus Asia*, a publication of the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP): Jagannath Panda, "The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making?", *Focus Asia: Perspective & Analysis*, No. 21, August 2017, pp. 1-11. Some section in this chapter are reprinted with permission.
6. The Silk Route is an ancient phenomenon. President Xi Jinping formally announced the two important components of the newly activated concept, i.e. Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) under the flagship "One Belt, One Road" in 2013. He announced the MSR in his speech to the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013 and SREB at the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. See "Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament", ASEAN-China Centre, October 3, 2013, at [http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c\\_133062675.htm](http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm) (Accessed January 20, 2018); "President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian countries", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, September 7, 2013, at [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/topics\\_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh\\_665686/t1076334.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml) (Accessed January 20, 2018).
7. This is based on the author's interaction with many experts in Japan, mainly from the National Institute for Defence studies (NIDS), Tokyo; Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo; Sofia University, Japan; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo; and other think tanks and universities. In India, the author had interactions with officials from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), etc.
8. "India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of Prime Minister to Japan", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 11, 2016, at <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan> (Accessed January 14, 2018).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. "Prime Minister's Speech at the inauguration of the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Gandhinagar", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 23, 2017, at <http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28478/Prime+Ministers+Speech+at+the+inauguration+of+the+Annual+Meeting+of+the+African+Development+Bank+AfDB+Gandhi+nagar+May+23+2017> (Accessed January 14, 2018).
12. Liu Zongyi has noted that "the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor is a duplication of the 'Freedom Corridor' designed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe"; and



- that “Indian media foresee this as a ‘counter’ initiative to China’s Belt and Road initiative”. See Liu Zongyi, “Belt and Road Remains Open to India despite Absence at Recent Forum”, *Global Times*, June 1, 2017, at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1049599.shtml> (Accessed 20 June 2017).
13. See, for instance, Avinash Nair, “To Counter OBOR, India and Japan Propose Asia-Africa Sea Corridor”, *The Indian Express*, May 31, 2017, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/to-counter-obor-india-and-japan-propose-asia-africa-sea-corridor-4681749/> (Accessed January 15, 2018); “India, Japan Forge Ahead with Connectivity Project to Counter China’s OBOR”, *Business Standard*, July 30, 2017, at [http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-japan-forge-ahead-with-connectivity-project-to-counter-china-s-obor-117073000073\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-japan-forge-ahead-with-connectivity-project-to-counter-china-s-obor-117073000073_1.html) (Accessed January 15, 2018).
  14. *Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development: A Vision Document*, Africa Development Bank Meeting, Ahmedabad, India, May 22-26, 2017.
  15. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
  16. Titli Basu, “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia Africa Growth Corridor”, *The Diplomat*, June 3, 2017, at <http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/thinking-africa-india-japan-and-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor/> (Accessed July 23, 2017)
  17. Chris Heathcote, “Forecasting Infrastructure Investment Needs for 50 countries, 7 Sectors through 2040”, *World Bank Group: Infrastructure & Public-Private Partnerships Blog*, August 10, 2017, at <http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/forecasting-infrastructure-investment-needs-50-countries-7-sectors-through-2040> (Accessed January 16, 2018).
  18. Morten Lauridsen, “Africa Needs More Private Investment. Here’s How to Make It Happen”, World Economic Forum, October 23, 2017, at <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/how-to-boost-investment-in-africa/> (Accessed January 16, 2018).
  19. “Quality Infrastructure: Building Trust for Trade”, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), May 2016, at [https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2016-05/UNIDO\\_Quality\\_system\\_0.pdf](https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2016-05/UNIDO_Quality_system_0.pdf) (Accessed January 17, 2018).
  20. India and Japan officially called their relationship a “special strategic and global partnership” under the *Vision 2025* plan in the Indo-Pacific region during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to India from December 11-13, 2015. *Vision 2025* aims to uphold the “principles of sovereignty”, “territorial integrity” and “peaceful settlement of disputes”, among other issues. See *Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World*, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, December 12, 2015, at [http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint\\_Statement\\_on\\_India\\_and\\_Japan\\_Vision\\_2025\\_Special\\_Strategic\\_and\\_Global\\_Partnership\\_Working\\_Together\\_for\\_Peace\\_and\\_Prosperty\\_of\\_the\\_IndoPacific\\_R](http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperty_of_the_IndoPacific_R) (Accessed January 17, 2018).
  21. *Priority Policy for Development Cooperation: FY 2017*, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, April 2017, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf> (Accessed January 17, 2018).
  22. *Inaugural U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue in New York*, Media Centre, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, September 30, 2015, at <http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/25868> (Accessed February 23, 2018)

23. *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road*, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council Authorisation, March 2015.
24. Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era", Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, at [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi\\_Jinping's\\_report\\_at\\_19th\\_CPC\\_National\\_Congress.pdf](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf) (Accessed February 23, 2018).
25. "Official Spokesperson's Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 13, 2017, at [http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official\\_Spokespersons\\_response\\_to\\_a\\_query\\_on\\_participation\\_of\\_India\\_in\\_OBORBRI\\_Forum](http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_query_on_participation_of_India_in_OBORBRI_Forum) (Accessed January 20, 2018).
26. Ibid.
27. "Cabinet Approves India's Accession to the Customs Convention on International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention)", Press Information Bureau, Government of India Cabinet, March 6, 2017, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=158890> (Accessed January 20, 2018).
28. Jagannath P. Panda, "Beijing's 'One Belt, One Road' Diplomacy and India", *India-China Relations: Politics of resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order*, Routledge, London and New York, 2017, p. 86.
29. "Asia's Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia – Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on The Future of Asia", Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, June 5, 2017, at [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97\\_abe/statement/201706/1222768\\_11579.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201706/1222768_11579.html) (Accessed January 20, 2018).
30. Charlotte Gao, "'Aimai': Japan's Ambiguous Approach to China's 'Belt and Road'", *The Diplomat*, November 22, 2017, at <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/aimai-japans-ambiguous-approach-to-chinas-belt-and-road/> (Accessed January 20, 2018).
31. "Japan and China Sign 23 Energy-saving, Environmental Cooperation Projects at Tokyo Meet", *The Japan Times*, December 24, 2017, at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/24/national/japan-china-sign-23-energy-saving-environmental-cooperation-projects-tokyo-meet/#.WmMn7STlfFI> (Accessed January 20, 2018).
32. "Asia's Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia", No. 29.
33. Ibid.
34. "Japan-China Summit Meeting", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 23, 2015, at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/a\\_o/c\\_m1/cn/page1e\\_000041.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page1e_000041.html) (Accessed June 26, 2017).
35. Jagannath P. Panda, "Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China's and India's Multilateral Drive", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 52(6), 2017, p. 857.
36. Occasionally, the West has been warning Africa to be cautious about the "new colonialism" from China and India that is designed to enhance their trade and economic contacts in the continent, conveniently oblivious of its own overarching reach and exploitation of African resources over centuries. See D.H. Shinn, "Emerging Powers Expand Ties with Africa", *International Policy Digest*,

- September 17, 2012, at <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/09/17/emerging-powers-expand-ties-with-africa/> (Accessed January 24, 2018).
37. Ibid.
  38. L. Dittmer, "China and the Developing World", in L. Dittmer and G.T. Yu (eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic*, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, pp.1-12.
  39. H. Wasserman, "China in South Africa: Media Responses to a Developing Relationship", *Chinese Journal of Communication*, 5(3), 2012, pp. 336-354.
  40. Maguemati Wagbou, "Africa: a Bridge between Latin America and Asia", South-South Collaborative Programme, Occasional Paper Series, COD 11, 2008, pp. 5-10.
  41. "Uniqueness of TICAD", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 13, 2016, at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page22e\\_000767.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page22e_000767.html) (Accessed January 24, 2018).
  42. This is in contrast with the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries' overall net ODA percentage, which has increased in the same period (see Figure 2). The DAC currently has a total of 30 members, including Japan. China is not a member. See "DAC Members", Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm>(Accessed June 26, 2017).
  43. For example, see Ayako Mie, "With TICAD, Japan Pursues African Growth and Export Markets", *The Japan Times*, August 9, 2016, at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/09/reference/ticad-africa-initiative-sees-japan-pursue-bigger-slice-economic-pie/> (Accessed June 26, 2017).
  44. "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)", August 27, 2016, Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC), Nairobi, Kenya, August 27, 2016, at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e\\_000496.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html) (Accessed June 22, 2017).
  45. "Japan's Measures for Africa at TICAD VI: 'Quality and Empowerment'", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000183835.pdf> (Accessed June 22, 2017).
  46. John Aglionby, "Tokyo Takes on Beijing in Africa, Claiming Quality over Speed", *Financial Times*, January 16, 2016, at <https://www.ft.com/content/564df09e-824a-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767?mhq5j=e2> (Accessed June 22, 2017); "Database Reveals Extent of China's Aid to Africa", *The Japan Times*, May 1, 2013, at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/01/asia-pacific/database-reveals-extent-of-chinas-aid-to-africa/#.WUvwCyTldII> (Accessed June 22, 2017); Ayako Mie, No. 43.
  47. "Agenda 2063" is a strategic continental framework to bring socio-economic transformation across Africa over the next 50 years. Its primary objective is to emphasise on growth and development. See "Agenda 2063", African Union, at <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/about> (Accessed February 10, 2018).
  48. See "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)", No. 44.
  49. "PM's Address at the Inauguration of the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank", PMINDIA, May 23, 2017, at [http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news\\_updates/pms-address-at-the-inauguration-of-the-annual-meeting-of-the-african-development-bank/](http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-address-at-the-inauguration-of-the-annual-meeting-of-the-african-development-bank/) (Accessed February 10, 2018).

50. This was a programme through which India aimed to expedite trade and economic cooperation with seven sub-Saharan African countries, namely South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia. See “Focus Africa Programme”, Government of India, at [http://focusafrica.gov.in/focus\\_africa\\_programme.html](http://focusafrica.gov.in/focus_africa_programme.html) (Accessed February 10, 2018).
51. Rajrishi Singhal, “Modi Resets India’s Africa Strategy”, *The Hindu Business Line*, November 17, 2015, at <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/modi-resets-indias-africa-strategy/article7888689.ece> (Accessed August 2, 2017).
52. “Briefing by Secretary (West) on PM’s Visit to Ethiopia and Tanzania”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 17, 2011, at <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?3195/Briefing+by+Secretary+West+on+PMs+visit+to+Ethiopia+and+Tanzania> (Accessed March 6, 2016).
53. Rajrishi Singhal, No. 51.
54. H.H.S. Vishwanathan, “India-Africa Relations: Nurturing an Enduring Partnership”, in Abhijnan Rej and Tanoubi Ngangom (eds.), *Common Futures: India and Africa in Partnership*, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2015, p. 12.
55. “Inaugural Address by Prime Minister at Second Raisina Dialogue”, New Delhi, January 17, 2017, at [http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/27948/Inaugural\\_Address\\_by\\_Prime\\_Minister\\_at\\_Second\\_Raisina\\_Dialogue\\_New\\_Delhi\\_January\\_17\\_2017](http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/27948/Inaugural_Address_by_Prime_Minister_at_Second_Raisina_Dialogue_New_Delhi_January_17_2017) (Accessed 10 February 2018).
56. “Full text: Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”, *Xinhuanet*, June 20, 2017, at [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c\\_136380414.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm) (Accessed February 11, 2018).
57. Xi Jinping, No. 24.
58. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the US, November 27, 2012, at [http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th\\_CPC\\_National\\_Congress\\_Eng/t992917.htm](http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm) (Accessed February 12, 2018).
59. EPQI is an expanded version of the earlier designed PQI, which centres on “quality infrastructure investment”, extending Japan’s targeted area of infrastructure investment from Asia to the rest of the world, with particular emphasis on Africa. “The ‘Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure’ Initiative Directed toward the G7 Ise-Shima Summit Meeting Announced”, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, May 23, 2016, at [http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0523\\_01.html](http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0523_01.html) (Accessed February 11, 2018).
60. Subhomoyo Bhattacharya, “Race for Supremacy: India, Japan Plan Alternative to Counter China’s OBOR”, *Business Standard*, May 16, 2017, at [http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/race-for-supremacy-india-japan-plan-alternative-to-china-s-obor-117051501273\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/race-for-supremacy-india-japan-plan-alternative-to-china-s-obor-117051501273_1.html) (Accessed February 14, 2018).
61. “‘Confluence of the Two Seas’: Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 22, 2007, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html> (Accessed February 14, 2018).
62. Ibid.